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coming to reconcile the language of the DRL with its proper interpretation.
Maureen F. Thompson

INSURANCE LAW

Ins. Law § 675: Attorney's fees awarded to compensate for services necessary to substantiatea prior claim for counsel fees
Section 675 of the Insurance Law 15 entitles a claimant to recover from the carrier reasonable attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a valid claim for first-party benefits that are overdue and
unpaid before an attorney has been retained.2 16 Although recovery
is measured by the value of the services actually performed by the
claimant's attorney,2 1 7 section 675 fails to prescribe the specific
215
216

N.Y. INS. LAW § 675(1)(McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
Id. Section 675(1) provides in pertinent part:

Payments of first party benefits shall be made as the loss is incurred ....
If a
valid claim or portion thereof was overdue and such claim was not paid before an
attorney was retained with respect to the overdue claim, the claimant shall also be
entitled to recover his attorney's reasonable fee, which shall be subject to limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.
In In re Country-Wide Ins. Co. (Barrios), 43 N.Y.2d 685, 371 N.E.2d 789, 401 N.Y.S.2d
26 (1977), the Court upheld an award for fees which greatly exceeded the claim. The Court
declared that under section 675, "[ilt is the arbitrator who is empowered to evaluate legal
services." Id. at 686, 371 N.E.2d at 789, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 27. In response to this broad discretion conferred on the arbitrator, the legislature amended section 675 to authorize the Superintendent of Insurance to issue regulations limiting the attorney's fees that may be recovered. See Ch. 892, § 13, [1977] N.Y. Laws 1835 (McKinney); notes 233 and 247 infra.
The New York no-fault law, which became effective February 1, 1974, was enacted to
remedy three defects in the common-law system of automobile accident tort litigation: the
system was excessively expensive and inefficient, distribution of compensation to accident
victims was inequitable, and the system placed an onerous burden on the State's judicial
system. Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 50-51, 34 N.E.2d 444, 448-50, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1,
8-9 (1975). Enactment was preceded by exhaustive legislative consideration. Id. at 53, 340
N.E.2d at 451, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 11. See note 244 infra.
A claim is overdue if the carrier does not make payment within 30 days after the claimant has shown proof of loss. N.Y. INs. LAW § 675(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). Once a
claim is overdue, in addition to attorney's fees, a carrier is liable for interest "at the rate of
two percent per month." Id.
Section 675(2) mandates that the carrier afford the claimant the option of submitting
any dispute arising under subdivision one to arbitration. N.Y. INS. LAW § 675(2)(McKinney
Supp. 1979-1980). As originally enacted, section 675(2) prescribed binding arbitration; the
statute was amended, however, in 1977 to authorize review of the arbitration award by a
master arbitrator. Ch. 892, § 13, [1977] N.Y. Laws 1835 (McKinney).
217 In
re Country-Wide Insurance Co. (Barrios), 43 N.Y.2d 685, 686, 371 N.E.2d 789,
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services that may be included in the award.2 1 Recently, in In re
Fresh Meadows Medical Associates, 19 the Court of Appeals held
that in an arbitration to resolve a disputed claim, the arbitrator
has the authority to order the carrier to pay the reasonable value
of the attorney's services expended in substantiating a claim for
his legal fees.220
Janina Tokarz was injured while riding as a passenger in an
automobile insured by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty). 221 She assigned her claim for payment of an x-ray bill to
Fresh Meadows Medical Associates (Fresh Meadows),2 22 which
submitted the claim to arbitration 223 following Liberty's refusal to
pay. 224 Liberty contested Fresh Meadows' request for payment of
both the x-ray bill and attorney's fees.225 In reply, Fresh Meadows
sought to justify these sums and requested an additional amount
for the services rendered in responding to Liberty's challenge.2 26
789, 401 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1977). Factors employed to determine the reasonable value of
services include the actual time expended by the attorney, the results achieved, the difficulty of the question in issue, and the reputation of the attorney. Jordan v. Freeman, 40
App. Div. 2d 656, 336 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1st Dep't 1972) (per curiam); Washington Fed. Savings
& Loan Assoc. v. Village Mall Townhouses, Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 227, 231, 394 N.Y.S.2d 772, 776
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1977). See generally Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); Colon v. Automatic Retailers Ass'n Serv. Inc., 74 Misc. 2d 478,
343 N.Y.S.2d 874 (N.Y.C. Civil Ct. N.Y. County 1973); Berger, Court Awarded Attorney's
Fees: What is "Reasonable?", 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281 (1977).
218 See note 216 and accompanying text supra. The only guidelines available are embodied in regulations formulated by the Superintendent of Insurance. See generally note
216 supra. Rather than delineating the services that are compensable, however, the regulations merely limit the monetary amount that may be recovered. See [1978] 11 N.Y.C.R.R. §
65.16(c)(7); note 244 and accompanying text infra.
219 49 N.Y.2d 93, 400 N.E.2d 303, 424 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1979), rev'g 65 App. Div. 2d 431,
411 N.Y.S.2d 655 (2d Dep't 1978).
220 49 N.Y.2d at 97, 400 N.E.2d at 304, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
221 Id. at 96, 400 N.E.2d at 303, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 362. Section 672 of the Insurance Law
mandates that all automobile liability insurance policies issued in New York provide coverage to persons, other than those in another motor vehicle, for losses resulting from the use
of a motor vehicle. N.Y. INs. LAW § 672(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); see [1978] 11
N.Y.C.R.R. § 60.1(a).
22 49 N.Y.2d at 96, 400 N.E.2d at 303, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 362. Fresh Meadows had performed the x-ray services for Ms. Tokarz. Id. The assignee of a claim against a carrier retains the rights of the assignor. In re Rosenblum, 50 App. Div. 2d 607, 375 N.Y.S.2d 387 (2d
Dep't 1975), aff'd 41 N.Y.2d 966, 363 N.E.2d 585, 394 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1977). See [1977] 11
N.Y.C.R.R. § 65.6(h)(1).
2123
See generally note 216 supra.
224 49 N.Y.2d at 96, 400 N.E.2d at 303, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
225 Id.
221 Id. Fresh Meadows maintained that the additional services involved "the reading of
[the carrier's] Brief, researching the Law contained therein and in my Reply Memorandum
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The arbitrator directed Liberty to pay the x-ray bill and the requested counsel fees. 2 2 7 The Supreme Court, Queens County, de-

nied Liberty's motion to vacate that portion of the award relating
to counsel fees.225 On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed in part, modifying the award by excluding the
amount representing the additional legal services expended in substantiating the original claim.229
A divided Court of Appeals reversed, 230 holding that an arbi-

trator's authority includes the power to award the reasonable cost
of an attorney's efforts to justify a claim for his fees. 231 Judge
Jones, writing for the majority, 2 2 noted that neither section 675
nor its accompanying regulations directly address the issue
whether counsel fees incurred in attempting to collect the original
fees are recoverable. 23 Relying upon the legislative intent of the
statute,23 4 the majority dismissed Liberty's contention that an enof Law, dictation of my Reply Memorandum of Law, revisions and corrections thereof." Id.

at 96-97, 400 N.E.2d at 304, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
227 Id. at 97, 400 N.E.2d at 304, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
228 See id. at 97, 400 N.E.2d at 304, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 363. The carrier moved to vacate
the award pursuant to CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii), which provides in pertinent part:
The award shall be vacated on the application of a party . . .if the court
finds that the rights of that party were prejudiced by:
(iii) an arbitrator, or agency or person making the award exceeded his power or
so imperfectly executed it that a final and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii) (McKinney 1963).
The courts have held that in the absence of "complete irrationality," an arbitration
award may not be challenged on the merits. Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 383, 278
N.E.2d 633, 634, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418, 419-20 (1972); In re Simmons, 59 App. Div. 2d 468, 471,
400 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100 (2d Dep't 1977).
229 65 App. Div. 2d 431, 411 N.Y.S.2d 655 (2d Dep't 1978), rev'd 49 N.Y.2d 93, 400
N.E.2d 303, 424 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1979). In an opinion written by Justice Suozzi, the unanimous appellate division reasoned that the insurer's right to contest an allegedly excessive
claim for fees would be rendered a nullity if the challenge would expose the carrier to increased liability for attorney's fees. Id. at 434, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 657-58.
230 49 N.Y.2d 93, 400 N.E.2d 303, 424 N.Y.S.2d 361.
231Id. at 97, 400 N.E.2d at 304, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
22 Judge Jones was joined by Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Gabrielli, Wachtler, and
Fuchsberg. Judge Meyer dissented in a separate opinion in which Judge Jasen concurred.
223 49 N.Y.2d at 98, 400 N.E.2d at 305, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 363. The regulations limiting
the amount on the fee award, see note 216 supra, were promulgated after the cause of action
arose in Fresh Meadows and thus were inapplicable. The Court noted, however, that even if
the regulations had covered this claim, they would offer little assistande since they neither
permitted nor prohibited the recovery of a fee for services rendered in substantiating a
claim for fees. Id. at 98 n.2., 400 N.E.2d at 305 n.2, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 363 n.2.
234 49 N.Y.2d at 98, 400 N.E.2d at 304, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 363. See note 216 supra.
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titlement to a "fee on a fee" should not be implied since the recovery of attorney's fees represents a deviation from the traditional
American rule that each party must bear his own litigation expenses. 3 5 Judge Jones observed that the statute had been enacted
to reimburse claimants forced to engage counsel to arbitrate their
valid claims because of the carrier's wrongful refusal to pay.236 To
accomplish this end, the majority concluded, the authority of the
arbitrator must extend to directing the recalcitrant carrier to compensate the claimant for all attorney's fees.23 7
Judge Meyer dissented, maintaining that since attorney's fees
are recoverable only pursuant to an express statutory or contractual authorization,2 8 the power to award the cost of substantiating
an original claim for fees cannot be implied for section 675.239
Moreover, Judge Meyer argued, legislative silence reflects an intent
to proscribe a "fee on a fee."24 0
A departure from both established rules of statutory construction and prior precedent, the Fresh Meadows decision represents a
significant judicial effort to effectuate the spirit of No-Fault. 241 Imposing liability on the carrier for the insured's counsel fees, section
675 stands contrary to the common-law principle that every litigant is responsible for the costs of his attorney's services.242 Al'31Id. at 98-99, 400 N.E.2d at 305, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 363-64. See note 242 and accompahying text
21 49
217Id.
2- Id.

infra.
N.Y.2d at 98, 400 N.E.2d at 305, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
at 99, 400 N.E.2d at 305, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
at 99, 400 N.E.2d at 305-06, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (Meyer, J., dissenting). See note

242 infra.
219Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
240 Id. at 100, 400 N.E.2d at 306, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (Meyer, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded, however, that the record contained no indication that the amount of the fee
excluded by the appellate division represented the fee on a fee; therefore, the proper course
should have been to order a rehearing before the arbitrator to determine that issue, since
the arbitrator has exclusive authority to compute the award. Id. at 100, 400 N.E.2d at 306,
424 N.Y.S.2d at 365 (citing In re Country-Wide Ins. Co. (Barrios), 43 N.Y.2d 685, 686, 371
N.E.2d 789, 401 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27)).
22 See note 216 supra.
242 The general rule that a party may not be held liable for his adversary's litigation
expenses, see, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); Hall
v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 (1973), may be altered only by statute or agreement. City of Buffalo v.
J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 262-63, 269 N.E.2d 895, 908, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 364 (1971);
1 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEY'S FEES ch. 13.1 (1973); see CPLR §§ 909 & 8303 (McKinney 1976 &
Supp. 1979-1980). This "American rule" grew out of the 19th century beliefs that every man
could adequately represent himself in our judicial system, and that since judges "discovered" law, lawyers were an unnecessary luxury. See Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not
A Cost Of Litigation?,49 IowA L. REv. 75 (1963). Numerous commentators have suggested
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though statutes in derogation of the common law should be narrowly construed, 4' the Fresh Meadows majority apparently
concluded that the legislative intent of section 675 superseded this
principle.244
It is submitted, however, that the Fresh Meadows decision,
while laudable in theory, does little to achieve its purpose of insulating the claimant from financial loss. Subsequent to the accrual
of the Fresh Meadows' cause of action, the Superintendent of Insurance promulgated regulations limiting the amount that may be
awarded for counsel fees.245 Since the maximum award under the
new regulations is substantially less than the rates currently being
charged by attorneys, 48 it appears that the only party truly benethat this rule be abandoned. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursements of Counsel Fees and
the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792 (1966); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A
Logical Development, 38 U. CoLo. L. REv. 202 (1966). For a discussion of the English system of awarding costs, see Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929).
14' Transit Comm. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 253 N.Y. 345, 171 N.E. 565 (1930); Scarpelli
v. Marshall, 92 Misc. 2d 244, 399 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1977); N.Y. STAT.
§ 301(a) (McKinney 1971).
244 See N.Y. STAT. § 92 (McKinney 1971). But see N.Y. STAT. § 302(a) (McKinney
1971). The majority noted the purpose of section 675-"to indemnify the claimant against
economic loss"-would be thwarted if the arbitrator's authority to award all fees was restricted. 49 N.Y.2d at 98, 400 N.E.2d at 305, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 364. But see note 248 and
accompanying text infra. For a comprehensive discussion of the need for no-fault, see R.
KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965).
The holding contravenes prior case law requiring express authority to recover counsel
fees sustained in enforcing an award of fees. See Doyle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1 N.Y.2d 439,
136 N.E.2d 484, 154 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1956). In Doyle, the defendant-carrier had issued the
plaintiff a liability policy containing a provision that the carrier would defend all lawsuits
arising out of the plaintiff's use of his property. Id. at 441, 136 N.E.2d at 485, 154 N.Y.S.2d
at 11-12. When the carrier refused to defend a nuisance action instituted against the insured, the plaintiff retained his own counsel. Id., 136 N.E.2d at 485-86, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
Thereafter, the plaintiff sued the carrier to recover the expenses of both defending the prior
action and bringing the subsequent suit. Id. at 442, 136 N.E.2d at 486, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
The Court of Appeals held that although the defendant was liable for the costs incurred by
the plaintiff in defending the nuisance action, the plaintiff was not entitled to an award of
the expenses of the second action. Id. at 444, 136 N.E.2d at 487, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 14. The
Court stated that "[tihe legal expenses necessarily incurred by the plaintiff. . . in seeking
legal redress for the wrong, while a loss in a sense resulting from the wrongful act of the
defendant, are not recoverable as general or special damages." Id. (citing 1 CLARK, NEW
YORK LAW OF DAMAGES § 145 (1925)). See Johnson v. General Mut. Ins. Co., 24 N.Y.2d 42,
246 N.E.2d 713, 298 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1969); Rekemeyer v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., 60 App. Div.
2d 492, 401 N.Y.S.2d 878 (3d Dep't 1978).
245 See [1978] 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 65.16(c)(7), 65.17(k) & note 216 supra.
"I According to the regulations, the amounts that may be awarded as counsel fees are:
$25 per hour for preparatory services, with a maximum of $250, and $40 per hour for personal appearances before an arbitrator or court. Additionally, unless the dispute is of such a
unique nature that extraordinary skills are required-a rare instance in no-fault litiga-
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fited is the attorney, who is guaranteed a minimum payment from
the award, leaving the client liable for the difference. 247 In order to
remedy this apparently unintended anomaly, it is suggested that
the regulations be amended to permit recovery against the carrier
2 48
on a scale that more closely reflects typical retainer agreements.
Richard L. O'Toole

JUDICIARY LAW

Jud. Law § 479: State constitutionally may prohibit attorneys
from soliciting by mail
In order to increase public awareness of the availability and
cost of legal assistance, the Supreme Court has held that a state
may not prevent an attorney from advertising the nature and fees
of his services. 24 9 Although the Court acknowledged the need for
tion-the award of fees may not exceed the recovery of first-party benefits, with interest.
[1978] 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 65.16(c)(7). Similar hourly limitations apply to awards made by
master arbitrators. [1978] 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 65.17(k). It should be noted that the $2850 award
affirmed by the FreshMeadows Court, calculated at $150 per hour, on an underlying claim
of $70, 49 N.Y.2d at 96, 400 N.E.2d at 304, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 362, would be impermissible
under the current regulations.
217 Notwithstanding the monetary restrictions contained in the regulations, the claimant remains contractually liable to his attorney for fees in excess of those awarded. It should
be noted that the regulations initially promulgated included a provision prohibiting the attorney from charging his client an amount in excess of the fees permitted by the regulations.
[1978] 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 65.16 (c)(7)(ix). This provision was ordered rescinded in Rachlin v.
Lewis, 96 Misc. 2d 701, 705, 409 N.Y.S.2d 594, 597 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978). The court
held that the regulations were inconsistent with § 675(1), since the statute only authorized
limitations on fees recovered from the carrier.Id. at 706, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 597. In addition,
the court concluded that it would be impermissible to interfere with any private contactual
arrangements a lawyer has made with his client. Id. (citing N.Y. Jud. Law § 474 (McKinney
1968)).
28 An increase in the permissible award of fees would enhance a claimant's ability to
retain competent counsel, since the successful attorney would be assured of adequate remuneration. It is submitted that a more realistic restriction might authorize an increased
award, calculated at an hourly rate for small claims and a contingency for larger claims,
since this would simulate typical private fee arrangements. See generally 1 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEY'S FEES ch. 1 (1973). A regulation of this nature would alleviate the difficulties of
computing the award by permitting the arbitrator or the court to award fees similar to those
the claimant would have paid his attorney, absent the statutory provision allowing recovery
from the carrier.
219 Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 374-77, 384 (1977). The Bates holding was limited
to the narrow question whether it was constitutionally permissible for a state to bar an
attorney from truthfully advertising the availability and cost of his services in a newspaper.
In finding that a state could not bar such conduct, the Bates Court reaffirmed its decision in

